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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. KLEIN, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
MARY AVALON KLEIN, 
Defendant and 
Respondent• 
Case No. 13994 
B R I E F O F R E S P O N D E N T 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant is appealing from that certain Judg-
ment made and entered pursuant to Stipulation of the parties 
on the 18th day of December, 1974. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE LOWER COURT 
The Appellant commenced the divorce action in 1971. 
The Respondent was granted a Decree of Divorce on her Counter-
claim in final amended form on November 22, 197 2. An appeal 
was taken, and on July 5, 1973, this Court made and entered 
its Decision with respect to that appeal. Klein v. Klein, 30 
Utah 2d 1, 511 P.2d 1284 (1973). 
While stating that it was not necessary to grant a 
new trial, this Court stated: 
"This seems to be a rather unusual order." 
"We think this was highly improper and may 
have been prejudicial . . . " 
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"The Judge who tried this case has been 
retired because of age, and another Judge 
will hear any future matters, so that 
counsel's fear of bias is of no import." 
"If the Decree causes financial distress, 
the ruling made can be reviewed if within 
one year after final judgment either party 
requests it." 
"Another possible reason for having the mat-
ter looked at within a year is the distri-
bution of the assets." 
"The decision of the Court was based upon 
an assumption that the net value of the 
assets of the plaintiff was $225,000.00 
11 
• • • • 
"Having confidence in the integrity of our 
trial courts and the ability of the judge 
to review the matter if presented to them, 
we affirm the judgment rendered and leave 
it to the lower court to determine if a 
modification should be made." 
On the 25th day of October, 1973, the Respondent 
filed her "Petition for Review of Economic Matters and Modifi-
cation of the Decree With Respect Thereto" (R 204). On 
November 12, 1973, the Respondent, in support of her Petition, 
filed an "Affidavit" (R 213), and a further "Affidavit and 
Proffer of Proof and Motion" (R 247). Based thereon, the 
trial court on the 12th day of November, 1973, issued its 
"Order to Show Cause" (R 220), and after a hearing on the 
"Order to Show Cause", the trial court on the 7th day of 
December, 1973, made and entered its "Order Relating to Review 
of Economic Matters and Modification of the Judgment and Decree 
With Reference Thereto" (R 233). 
The Order of December 7, 1973, provided for further 
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discovery and granted to the parties a further hearing with 
unrestricted opportunity to present to the Court evidence 
bearing upon all economic matters arising from the marriage, 
"so that there may be presented to the court full and com-
plete evidence concerning these matters" (R 234) . In its 
Order of December 7, 1973, the trial court stated: 
"The Court has noted the language contained 
in the decision of the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah with reference to this matter. 
While the Court notes that there is in the 
original Judgment and Decree of Divorce, 
the Amended Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
and the Decision of the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah, reference to 'serious 
financial distress1, it is the conclusion 
of this Court that 'serious financial dis-
tress ' is a relative matter and the Court 
cannot adequately respond to the Petition 
of the defendant and herein grant or deny 
the ultimate relief prayed for without com-
pletely reviewing all of the economic mat-
ters resulting from the marital relation-
ship. Furthermore, the Court has noted the 
reference in the Supreme Court Decision of 
the possibility of prejudice by the trial 
court originally trying this matter, and 
the further statement of the Supreme Court 
that 'Another possible reason for having 
the matter looked at within a year is the 
distribution of the assets'. Again, it is 
the conclusion of this Court that this 
Court cannot adequately respond to the 
Petition of the defendant and grant or deny 
further relief to the defendant without 
completely reviewing all of the economic 
matters resulting from the marital relation-
ship." (R 236). 
Following the Order of December 7, there was exten-
sive discovery and a hearing which commenced on July 23, 1974 
and which continued through July 25, 26, 29 and 30, at which 
time both parties rested. 
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At the direction of the trial court, both parties 
thereafter submitted their memorandums and proposals with 
respect to a division of the properties (R 334 through 356 
and R 357 through 374). Thereafter, and again at the dir-
ection of the trial court, the parties submitted reply memo-
randums (R 306 through 318 and R 319 through 333). 
After the Memorandums and the Reply Memorandums had 
been filed and after arguments with respect thereto, the 
trial court on November 11, 1974, made and entered extensive 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R 377) and its Judg-
ment (R 398). 
After the entry of the Judgment on November 11, 1974, 
the Appellant filed various motions which came on for hearing 
commencing December 6, 1974, and continued through December 9, 
1974. During the Noon recess on December 9, 1974, the par-
ties reached a settlement and after the Noon recess, the set-
tlement was read into the record, agreed to by the parties 
and their counsel, and approved by the Court. (See the trans-
cript of December 9 and December 18, 1974, pages 2 through 
13) . 
After the Stipulation was entered into in open 
Court with counsel and parties present, and thereupon approved 
by the Court, counsel entered into a written Stipulation 
(R 431), and counsel for both parties further executed a 
motion moving the Court to enter its Judgment based on the 
Stipulation. (R 438). On December 12, 1974, counsel for both 
parties "accepted, approved and agreed as to form and content" 
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(R 450) that certain Judgment which was made and entered by 
the Court on December 18, 1974 (R 443). 
Prior to the entry of the Judgment on December 18, 
1974, the Appellant attempted to rescind the Stipulation 
(R 440). The trial court denied the motion to rescind 
(R 441), and on December 18, 1974, made and entered the 
Judgment which is the only judgment from which the Appellant 
appeals (R 552). 
The Appellant filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
of December 18, 1974 (R 536) and a lengthy Memorandum in sup-
port thereof (R 501). After a hearing on the Motion, the 
trial court on January 28, 1975, made and entered its Order 
denying the Motion and setting forth its reasons therefor 
(R 547). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks to have the consent judgment 
set aside, to have the Court make an equitable modification 
of the original Divorce Decree, or to remand the case back 
to the trial court with further instructions. The Appellant 
also seeks a new trial. The Respondent resists the relief 
sought by the Appellant, and submits that this matter has 
finally been carefully and equitably adjudicated by the trial 
court, and that the parties thereafter entered into a Stipula-
tion and a Judgment was based thereon which conclusively set-
tled all of the issues between the parties, and that the 
case is now res judicata and non-appealable. 
-5-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It is undisputed that the Appellant and Respondent 
were married on the 8th day of May, 1953, and that three sons 
were delivered Ceasarian section as issue of the marriage 
(T 1377). The trial court fixed custody in the Respondent, 
and also fixed the alimony at $300.00 per month, and child 
support at $100.00 per month per child. There is no dispute 
or contention with reference to these matters. 
At the time of the marriage, the Appellant's only 
assets consisted of two automobiles and a small bank account 
(T 1377), perhaps $1,500.00 (T 1046). The Respondent had 
some furniture, an automobile and perhaps $500.00 to $1,000.00 
(T 1036, 1377). 
Appellant is educated, intelligent and articulate, 
and regards himself as "academic" (T 572), and places his 
friends in a "semi-educated" level (T 573). Respondent has 
a high school education and one year of business college 
obtained over a number of years at night school. She has 
spent her married years - from age 29 to age 50 - as a house-
wife and mother (T 1379). She is now 52 years old. She has 
attempted to do secretarial work, but couldn't because of a 
back problem (T 1379). She has recently attempted to sell 
real estate (T 1379). She is not in good health and is in 
need of surgery (T 1380, 1390). 
During the marriage, the parties lived in rather 
stylish fashion: a $100,000.00 home and a membership at Willow 
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Creek; a twin-engine plane and several trips a year to Palm 
Springs, Las Vegas, Aspen and California; entertaining and 
eating out; Lincoln Continentals; two or three trips a year 
to California, Phoenix, Catalina (T 1381, 1382 and 1493), 
and the Appellant enjoyed the luxury of gambling losses 
(T 1492). 
In 1971, the Appellant left the marital home and 
children and refused to maintain a marital relationship with 
the Respondent. He had, on occasion, been violent toward the 
Respondent, had physically abused and struck her, had kept 
company with other women and had been unfaithful to the Respon-
dent (R 164). Since the divorce, the Appellant has remarried, 
but the Respondent has not (T 1378). At the time of the 
trial in July, 1974, the two younger sons (age 18 and 14), 
were at home with the Respondent. The eldest child was on 
a mission in Argentina (T 1378). 
Since the divorce, the Respondent has lived poorly. 
She can't afford to take vacations; she can no longer enter-
tain; she can no longer drive a Lincoln. She and the child-
ren cannot afford to go to shows together as a family 
(T 1382, 1383). She has attempted to supplement her income 
and works many hours a day and holds open houses on listed 
properties on Saturdays and Sundays (T 1383). She has spent 
many hours at the job, but has earned very little money 
(T 1384). The family situation has become chaotic because 
of her attempt to supplement her income and meet the demands 
of trying to sell real estate (T 1384, 1385). She has not 
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had sufficient funds with which to maintain the residence -
the carpets are threadbare and there are plumbing problems 
(T 1385 and Ex. 35-D). She has continued to reside in the 
$100,000.00 home awarded to her at Willow Creek because of 
emotional involvement with the home, and because it is the 
home of the children. She has resisted changing them to a 
new neighborhood. The friends of the children live in the 
area, and the children make use of the Willow Creek facility 
(T 1385, 1386). From the time of the original trial in 1972 
to the time of the further hearing in 1974, she had fallen 
behind in payment of her obligations and had substantial 
unpaid bills that were due and owing (Ex. 35-D). 
In summary, then, we have a couple who married in 
1953, with neither party bringing any substantial assets to 
the marriage. The Respondent was, at the time of the marriage, 
29 years .of age. She has spent her married life principally 
as a housewife and mother. She is not in good health; she 
has no special training or talent to provide for her future 
years. She is now over 50 years of age and her opportunities 
are limited and restricted. On the other hand, the Appellant, 
who is approximately the same age, is intelligent, educated 
and articulate. He apparently enjoys good health. He pre-
cipitated or contributed greatly to the divorce, and he is 
remarried. 
The dispute in this case relates to the division 
of properties accumulated during the marriage. There is 
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little or no disagreement as to what those properties are, 
but there is substantial disagreement as to their values. 
In the original trial, presided over by Judge Faux, Amended 
Findings of Fact were made and entered on November 22, 1972, 
fixing total assets at $291,890.00, less liabilities of 
$66,800.00, for a net worth of $225,000.00 (R 166, 167)/ 
The trial court attempted to award one-half of these values 
to the Respondent by giving her the residence at a value of 
$103,000.00, a Chevrolet automobile and proceeds from the 
sale of four lots with a value approximated at that time of 
$6,000.00 (R 160, 161). 
By contrast, the trial court, Judge Taylor, after 
an extensive trial and testimony from expert witnesses and 
extensive briefing and arguments by counsel, found that the 
total assets accumulated during the marriage had a fair mar-
ket value of $2,037,535.63, and that the total liabilities 
were $288,725.65, and that the resulting net worth was, then, 
the assets less the liabilities, or $1,748,809.98 (R 379, 380). 
The trial court then made a division of these prop-
erties with a value of the total assets to be awarded to the 
Respondent of $84 2,144.00 and requiring her to discharge 
obligations in the amount of $98,856.65, for a net distribu-
tion to the Respondent of $743,287.35 (R 406, 407 and 408). 
The Court awarded to the Appellant properties with 
a value of $1,121,471.63, and required the Appellant to dis-
charge obligations in the amount of $189,869.00, leaving to 
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the Appellant properties, then, with a net value of 
$931,602.63 (R 407, 408). 
For a detailed analysis of the properties of the 
marital estate and the values with reference thereto, the 
Court's attention is directed to Memorandum and Proposal 
of the defendant and Exhibits thereto (R 334 through 356). 
The trial court, in its Findings of Fact made and 
entered on November 11, 1974, specifically found: 
"The inadequacy and inaccuracy of the origi-
nal and amended Findings, Conclusions and 
Decree, resulted from either the unknowing 
and unconscious prejudice of the initial 
judge who tried this matter, or as a result 
of his misunderstanding of the facts. The 
error of the trial court who tried this case 
in the first instance was in failing to prop-
erly describe, define and itemize substan-
tial portions of the property accumulated 
during the marriage, and to assign values 
with respect to said properties, and to 
include said values in a determination of 
the net marital estate. As a result of 
the inadequacy and inaccuracy of the origi-
nal and amended Findings, Conclusions and 
Decree, the defendant MARY AVALON KLEIN has 
been and will continue to suffer unwarranted, 
unconscionable and unnecessary financial 
distress, unless said Findings, Conclusions 
and Decree are amended to provide for an 
equitable and reasonable property division 
as herein set out." (R 387). 
The description and evaluation of the assets is 
complex. Values of much of the property depended upon apprais-
als. While there was difference of opinion between the var-
ious appraisers, the values determined by Judge Taylor are 
amply supported by the evidence. The Appellant, in his Brief, 
makes no contention that the Findings with respect to the prop-
-10-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
erties and values are unsupported by the evidence. 
The assets which were evaluated by Judge Taylor 
were the same assets that were considered in the previous 
trial by Judge Faux. It does not appear from the Appellant's 
Brief that the Appellant makes any contention to the con-
trary. ••:•'•-
Following the original Taylor Judgment of November 
11, 1974/ the parties entered into the Stipulation with ref-
erence to the modification thereof (R 431), and made their 
motion moving the Court for a Judgment, Decree and Order 
amending the Taylor Judgment of November 11, 1974 (R 438). 
Based on the Stipulations and the motion, the trial court, 
Judge Taylor, on December 18, 1974, made and entered its 
Judgment, Decree and Order Amending and Modifying the Court's 
Judgment of November 11, 1974 (R 443). The stipulated Modi-
fication of the Judgment was based upon an offer made by the 
Respondent which the Appellant accepted. (See the trans-
cript of December 9 and December 18, 1974, pages 2 through 
13). The effect of the offer made by the Respondent and 
the acceptance thereof by the Appellant and the modification 
of the Judgment based thereon was to reduce the properties 
being awarded to the Respondent in the approximate amount of 
$200,000.00, and to increase the values of the properties 
being awarded to the Appellant in the approximate amount of 
$200,000.00. 
As the matter now stands, then, the net value of 
the properties being awarded to the Respondent after the dis-
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charge of certain obligations, is $543,287.35, The net value 
of the properties being awarded to the Appellant after the 
discharge of certain obligations, is $1,131,602.63. 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT OF DECEMBER 18, 1974 IS 
A VALID AND BINDING JUDGMENT BASED ON 
THE COURT APPROVED ORAL AND WRITTEN 
STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES. ALL MAT-
TERS IN CONTROVERSY HAVE BEEN SETTLED 
AND THE CASE IS RES JUDICATA AND NOT 
SUBJECT TO APPEAL. 
Before addressing the question as to the validity 
of the Judgment of December 18, 1974, it is to be noted 
that there is a prior Judgment dated November 11, 1974 
(R 398). There has been no appeal from the prior Judgment. 
The Notice of Appeal does not specify any appeal from the 
prior Judgment (R 552). It is submitted that if the Court 
should grant the relief asked by the Appellant to have the 
consent Judgment of December 18, 1974 set aside, then the 
Judgment of November 11, 1974 will become the extant Judgment 
which will fix the rights of the parties. This is satisfac-
tory to the Respondent. If this Court agrees and concludes 
that the Judgment of November 11, 1974 would become the effec-
tive extant Judgment upon setting aside the Judgment of 
December 18, 1974, then the Respondent concurs therewith, 
and agrees thereto, and this Court may dispose of this case 
without further attention by granting the relief sought in 
plaintiff's appeal, and declaring that upon doing so the Judg-
ment of November 11, 1974 will be and is the effective 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
extant Judgment. 
The Appellant does not make any contention that 
the Judgment from which he appeals is contrary to or incon-
sistent with the terms of the Stipulation he entered into 
in open Court (which was approved by the Court), nor the 
written Stipulation that was thereafter signed by his coun-
sel. The Judgment was approved by his counsel, both as to 
form and content (R 450). Rather, the Appellant contends 
that he simply didn't understand the Stipulation. In this 
respect, it should be noted that the Appellant is an educated 
man over fifty years of age. He has had sufficient intelli-
gence and acumen to accumulate an estate of approximately Two 
Million Dollars in the past twenty years. He was represented 
by the same counsel from the commencement of the divorce 
action in October, 1971, through the date of the Stipulation, 
December 9, 1974, and the entry of the Judgment based thereon. 
He was present at proceedings on many occasions, specifically 
including April 11, 12, 13, 14 and" 17, 1972, the 3rd day of 
Decmeber, 1973, July 23, 25, 26, 29 and 30, 1974, and December 
6 and 9, 1974, and many other dates when various matters were 
argued to the Court. During the marriage and the accumulation 
of the assets, he was responsible therefor, and on December 9, 
1974 he enjoyed a peculiar and special knowledge concerning 
the assets, the ownerships, the values, and the many intrica-
cies concerning the properties and the divorce action. With 
that background, understanding and knowledge, he was present 
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in the Courtroom on December 6 when his motions were being 
argued, and again on the morning of December 9. During a 
recess on the morning of December 9, counsel for Respondent 
made a further offer of settlement to counsel for Appellant. 
Those details were discussed between the Appellant and his 
counsel during the two-hour Noon recess, and at the commence-
ment of proceedings at 2:00 on the afternoon of December 9, 
counsel for the Appellant advised Respondents counsel and 
the Court that they had accepted Respondent's offer of set-
tlement. (See page 2 of the transcript of December 9, 1974). 
It should be noted that the offer made by the Respondent which 
was accepted by the Appellant, was a further concession by 
the Respondent which decreased the net values of piroperties 
being awarded to her by approximately $200,000.00, and increased 
the values being awarded to the Appellant by the Scime amount. 
The Respondent made this concession to attempt to put an 
end to the protracted, bitter, emotionally distressing, time-
consuming and expensive litigation. 
The Appellant in his Brief attempts to persuade 
the Court that the transcript of the Stipulation itself 
demonstrates that the Appellant did not understand.. He 
cites four lines from that transcript as evidence that the 
Appellant did not understand. Those four lines are taken 
out of context. The questions and answers with respect thereto 
related to only one specific matter. Following that exchange, 
the Appellant had an opportunity to consult with his counsel 
and then, at the conclusion of the rather lengthy Stipulation 
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read into the record by counsel, Mr. Klein stated: 
"By way of the record, I accept the stipu-
lation and I so understand. Spoken by 
Robert D. Klein." 
(The Courtfs attention is directed to pages 2 through 13 of 
the transcript of the hearing held on the 9th day of December, 
1974, and for the above-referenced quote, the Court's atten-
tion is directed to the bottom of page 11 thereof). 
The references in Appellant's Brief to his lack of 
understanding, his shock, his disorientation, his mental 
fatigue at the time of the Stipulation, are self-serving, 
unsubstantiated and unsupported delcarations that are not 
entitled to credibility. The trial court was present and 
observed the conduct and demeanor of the Appellant, and could 
not thereafter be persuaded that Appellant did not know what 
he was about. 
It is beyond comprehension and defies logic for 
anyone to believe or acknowledge that the Appellant under the 
circumstances did not fully understand what he was doing. A 
more rational explanation of the Appellant's conduct is that 
he has attempted from the beginning, through a war of attrition, 
to starve the Respondent into submission. At the hearing on 
his motions on December 6 and again on December 9, he finally 
won another concession from the Respondent, and that is, she 
acquiesced in a further division of the property that decreased 
her values by approximately $200,000.00, and increased his by 
the same amount. Having accomplished that task, the Appellant 
then sought to rescind his agreement, change counsel, and 
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start negotiating further under a threat of further appeal, 
further bitterness, further emotional distress, further 
poverty, and further legal expenses for the Respondent. 
The legion of authorities cited by the Appellant 
in Point I of his Brief constitute a smokescreen to obfuscate 
what the law really is. The law in this jurisdiction is well 
settled and has been stated in the case of Johnson, et ux v. 
Peoples Finance & Thrift Company, et al, 2 Utah 2d 246, 272 
P.2d 171 (July, 1954). In that case, the parties entered 
into a stipulation and thereafter failed to perform. The 
plaintiffs moved the Court to set aside the stipulation based 
upon the ground that the stipulation was entered into 
"Improvidently, inadvertently and mistakenly, 
and that said stipulation was entered into 
under a mistake of fact which, if enforced, 
will amount to constructive fraud against 
the plaintiffs." 
Thereafter, and notwithstanding plaintiffs1 motion, the trial 
court entered a judgment based upon the stipulation. An appeal 
was taken from that judgment, and this Court said: 
"It would indeed be a serious reflection 
upon our system of jurisprudence if parties 
could stipulate an agreement of settlement, 
but refuse with impunity from performing. 
Courts are not impotent when one or more 
parties to a stipulation becomes recalci-
trant . . . We think the trial court took 
the proper course when he entered judgment 
embodying the terms of the stipulation . . . 
Judgments of courts are presumed to be correct 
if nothing in the record appears to the con-
trary . . . The trial court considered 
plaintiffs1 objections and found them want-
ing in bases. In view of the state of the 
record, we must assume the judgment is sup-
ported by the stipulation." 
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Again, this Court, in the case of Bean v. Carlos, 
reported in 21 Utah 2d 309, 445 P.2d 144 (September, 1968), 
directly addressed the question that is raised in this case 
on almost similar facts. After trial had commenced and evi-
dence had been taken, the parties advised the court that they 
had agreed upon a settlement. The terms of the settlement 
were stated for the record. The court queried: 
"The parties, several of the parties are 
present. You all understand that to be 
the stipulation and the agreement for 
settlement?" 
Subsequently, a written stipulation was submitted to one of 
the parties, who refused to sign. A motion was filed for 
entry of judgment in accordance with the stipulation made in 
open court. The trial court made and entered the judgment 
based on those stipulations. An appeal was taken therefrom, 
and this Court cited with approval and quoted from Johnson 
v. Peoples Finance & Thrift Company, supra, and affirmed the 
action of the trial court in entering the judgment. 
The legal treatises also support this view: 
"A judgment by consent is entitled to the 
same presumptions as any other judgment 
rendered in the ordinary course of proced-
ure. When made by consent, it is presumed 
that the judgment is made in view of the 
existing facts and circumstances of the 
litigation, and that these facts are within 
the knowledge of the parties." (47 Am. Jur. 
2d, Judgments, Section 1088). 
"In the absence of fraud, mistake, or collu-
sion, a judgment by consent is binding and 
conclusive upon the parties and those in 
privity with them, to the same extent as 
judgments rendered upon controverted facts 
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and due consideration thereof upon a contes-
ted trial. And notwithstanding flat state-
ments to the contrary in some of the cases, 
which, however, in their actual holdings 
fail to bear out these statements, it is well 
settled, as a general proposition, that a judg-
ment or decree, though entered by consent or 
agreement of the parties, is res judicata to 
the same extent as if entered after contest." 
(47 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, Section 1089). 
In the case of Washington Asphalt Company v. Harold 
Kaser Company, 316 P.2d 126 (1957), the Supreme Court of 
Washington, with respect to a stipulated consent judgment, 
opined as follows: 
"We are of the opinion that all issues pend-
ing between appellants and respondent . . . were 
merged in the stipulation entered into by the 
parties at the time of trial. 
A judgment by consent or stipulation of the 
parties is construed as a contract between 
them embodying the terms of the judgment. It 
excuses all prior errors and operates to end 
all controversies between the parties, within 
the scope of the judgment. In the absence of 
fraud, mistake, or want of jurisdiction, a 
judgment by consent will not be reviewed on 
appeal." (Citing numerous cases). 
It is respectfully submitted that this entire matter 
has been conclusively settled by the stipulation and agreement 
of the parties and by the Judgment entered based thereon. It 
is further submitted that by such consent and judgment, the 
matter is totally res judicata, and there is no unresolved 
issue left from which a party can appeal. In this respect, 
at the hearing on December 9, 1974, where the Stipulation was 
entered into, the following colloquy took place between the 
Court, counsel and parties: 
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"MR. COWLEY: Your Honor, I'd like to 
suggest one more thing that needs to be 
discussed in front of these people. Make 
sure they understand this, too. By enter-
ing into this stipulation and settling it 
on this basis, neither party has any fur-
ther appeal rights left in this matter. 
It's closed. 
THE COURT: That's true. It is a correct 
statement in law. There is no error if 
the parties willingly and I suppose there 
might be a little technicality. Maybe I 
ought to put them under oath, although they 
have been under oath for four or five days 
in the prior proceeding. 
MR. COWLEY: I want to know — make sure 
both know they have no further appeal rights, 
and this concludes the matter forever. 
MR. KLEIN: By way of the record, I accept 
the stipulation and I so understand. Spoken 
by Robert D. Klein. 
THE COURT: Do you understand the same, 
Mrs. Klein? 
MRS. KLEIN: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Well, that's nice. Now, we've 
finally got it completed. Who is going to 
prepare it?" 
(See transcript of December 9 and 18, 1974, pages 11 and 12). 
Since the matter was finally and conclusively set-
tled by the agreement of the parties, with the approval of 
the Court, the entire matter is now res judicata, and this 
appeal should be dismissed. 
The Respondent moves the Court for an Order of 
Dismissal. 
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POINT II 
THE JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 11, 1974 WAS EQUITABLE 
AS BETWEEN THE PARTIES, AND THE MODIFICATION 
THERETO OF DECEMBER 18, 1974 RENDERED THE MODI-
FICATION MORE FAVORABLE TO THE APPELLANT. 
If this Court concludes that the matters set forth 
in Point I of the Respondent's Brief are not dispositive, 
then the Court must look to the equities. 
In such event, the Respondent does not disagree 
with the law cited by the Appellant to the effect that the 
parties are entitled to the Judgment of the Supreme* Court 
as well as that of the trial court. The Respondent acknow-
ledges that if this matter is properly before this Court, then 
the Court has the right to review the matter and make its own 
determinations with respect to the division of the property. 
The Court also has the alternative right to remand the matter 
for further proceedings with or without directions to the trial 
court* 
Assuming, but not acknowledging, that this Court • 
may not find the matters set forth in Point I above* dispositive, 
it becomes necessary to examine the law and the facts to 
determine if the division of the property was proper and 
equitable. 
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended, 
(1973 Supp.) sets forth the basic standard with respect to 
the division of property: 
"When a decree of divorce is made, the court 
may make such orders in relation to the children, 
property and parties, and the maintenances of 
-20-
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the parties and children, as may be equitable. 
The court shall have continuing jurisdiction 
to make such subsequent changes or new orders 
with respect to the support and maintenance 
of the parties, the custody of the children 
and their support and maintenance, or the 
distribution of the property as shall be 
reasonably necessary." 
The Utah Supreme Court has, on many occasions, 
attempted to provide a more definitive criteria by which the 
appropriateness of a property distribution could be judged. 
In 1898, this Court suggested that the wife should have an 
award of one-third of the property. Griffin v. Griffin, 18 
Utah 98, 55 P.84 (1898). 
By 1926, this Court provided in a case that the 
wife should receive at least one-half of her husband's prop-
erty. Stewart v. Stewart, 66 Utah 366, 242 P.947 (1926). 
In 1930, this Court reversed the trial court's 
decision in which the lower court had awarded the wife approxi-
mately a one-third interest. This Court said that under the 
circumstances, the wife was entitled to an award of 50% of the 
marital estate. Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 P.214 
(1930). 
In 1937, a trial court awarded the wife two-thirds 
of the property. On appeal, the Supreme Court modified the 
trial court's decision and reduced the wife's share to 50%. 
In doing so, the Court outlined nine specific factors to be 
considered in making a division of the property. Pinion v. 
Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 265 (1937). 
In endeavoring to apply the nine factors in subse-
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quent cases, the Court continued to find a 50% distribution 
to the wife appropriate where the marriage had lasted over 
a long period of time and the property had been substantially 
acquired during the marriage. Johnson v. Johnson, 107 Utah 
147, 152 P.2d 426 (1944). 
In 1949, the Court upheld an award of 80% to the 
wife as equitable and fair, Tremayne v. Tremayne, 116 Utah 
483, 211 P.2d 452 (1949). 
In 1951, this Court attempted to redefine and 
expand the criteria set forth in Pinion. The Court divided 
the factors to be considered into those existent at the time 
of the marriage and those existent at the time of the divorce. 
There were six factors in the former category and nine in the 
latter category. MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 
P.2d 1066 (1951). 
Finally, in Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 
977 (1956), Mr. Justice Crockett, speaking for the Court, sum-
marized in a substantially shortened and more concise form 
the criteria to be considered in making division of property: 
"The courtfs responsibility is to endeavor 
to provide a just and equitable adjustment 
of their economic resources so that the par-
ties can reconstruct their lives on a happy 
and useful basis. In doing so it is neces-
sary for the court to consider, in addition 
to the relative guilt or innocence of the 
parties, an appraisal of all the attendant 
facts and circumstances: the duration of the 
marriage; the ages of the parties; their 
social positions and standards of living; 
their health; considerations relative to 
children; the money and property they pos-
sess and how it was acquired; their capaci-
ties and training and their present and po-
tential incomes." 
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When the marriage is of long duration, the prop-
erty in dispute was acquired during the course of the mar-
riage, and the wife's earning capacity is limited consider-
ably, an equal distribution of the property means at least 
a 50% distribution to the wife. Where those factors exist 
and the lower court awards the wife at least 50% of the 
marital estate, the trial court decision will not be dis-
turbed on appeal. Slaughter v. Slaughter, 18 Utah 2d 274, 
421 P.2d 503 (1966); Johnson v. Johnson, supra, Tremayne v. 
Tremayne, supra. 
Where the trial court failed to award the wife at 
least 50% of the marital estate under circumstances such as 
exist in this case, the trial court's decision was modified 
on appeal. Stewart v. Stewart, supra; Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 
supra. 
The parties to this action were married in 1953 
and they separated in the Fall of 1971 and were divorced in 
1972. The Respondent's earning capacity is much less than 
that of the Appellant. She has occupied her time as a house-
wife and mother, while the Appellant has continued to enjoy 
substantial professional, economic and financial growth. 
As the matter now stands, the Judgment of December 18, 
1974 awards to the Respondent properties with a net value of 
$543,287.35, and to the Appellant properties with a net value 
of $1,131,620.63. Again, it should be repeated that the Appel-
lant does not contend that the values are unsupported by the 
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evidence. Furthermore, the values are net after allowance 
for all debts. 
Essentially, there is a division with one-third of 
the net assets being awarded to the wife and two-thirds being 
awarded to the husband. Under the existing circumstances 
where the property was acquired during the marriage over a 
twenty-year period, the division is more than fair to the 
Appellant. Considering the state of the law and the facts in 
this case, it is incomprehensible and indeed, offensive, for 
the Appellant to suggest that he has been treated inequitably 
and unfairly. 
It has to be assumed that this Court will not find 
that the Judgment of November 11, 1974, as modified by the 
stipulated Judgment of December 18, 1974, is inequitable as 
to the Appellant. 
The other contention asserted by the Appellant is 
that the division will cause a collapse of the marital estate. 
This assertion is so patently absurd and the piecemeal selec-
tion of isolated facts in Appellant's Brief are so out of con-
text that a line-by-line response thereto is, within the time 
and space available, essentially impossible. It is felt neces-
sary, however, to attempt to place the matter in perspective. 
First, the only new burden imposed upon the Appel-
lant by the Judgment of November 11 and December 18, 1974, 
insofar as cash is required, is the obligation to pay Respon-
dent $50/000.00 without interest over a ten-year period. This 
was agreed to by the Appellant in the Stipulation of December 9, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1974, and was done so because he received offsetting bene-
fits improving his net position by the sum of approximately 
$200,000-00. If the Appellant cannot pay the $50,000.00 
out of earnings, then the Appellant can certainly liquidate 
a very small portion of the large and diverse properties 
awarded to him. This being the only new burden agreed to and 
imposed upon the Appellant, it is difficult to imagine that 
this will cause the collapse of the Appellant's million dollar 
empire. All of the other obligations of the Appellant (prin-
cipally to pay indebtednesses upon properties) were already 
extant. 
Secondly, contrary to assertions by the Appellant, 
the parties aire not left engaged in common ownership or joint 
affairs. The Judgments were carefully drafted by the Court 
to prevent such a situation. In this respect, we call to 
this Court's attention the results of the Judgment: 
A. The parties are not left with joint owner-
ship of any property. 
B. The Appellant is left with full ownership 
of all stocks in all the corporations. 
C. With respect to the Seegmiller property in 
St. George (approximately 1200 acres), 
there is to be a physical division thereof, 
with 600 acres to each party. There was a 
$75,000.00 mortgage on the Seegmiller prop-
erty that was due and owing at time of trial. 
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The Judgment requires the Appellant to 
discharge the property being awarded to the 
Respondent from the lien of that mortgage 
within three years* The obligation of the 
Appellant to discharge this obligation was 
agreed to be secured by a pledge of the Major 
Enterprises stock. 
With respect to the Pershing Nelson-Wanda 
Sandberg property in St. George, the Appel-
lant sold the property on a contract for 
the sum of $504,000.00 to a corporation of 
which the Appellant owns 82-1/2% of the stock. 
The contract is left unmodified by the Judg-
ments , and all of the stock is awarded to the 
Appellant. The Judgment provides for a lien 
in favor of Respondent upon the contract 
receivable of the Appellant, and the land 
represented thereby, in favor of the Respon-
dent, in the amount of $252,000.00, payable 
to the Respondent at the rate of $600.00 per 
acre without interest, only as the land is 
sold or used by the Appellant. The market value 
of Appellant's interest in this 420 acres 
and the corporate stock was determined to be 
$700,762.50 (R 382). 
There are fourteen finished apartments in 
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St. George, together with 3.1 acres of con-
tiguous unimproved acreage. The Judgment 
awards the improved apartments to the Respon-
dent, subject to the mortgage thereon, which 
she is required to pay. The Judgment awards 
the unimproved land to the Appellant, so that 
he may sell or develop the same as he chooses. 
F. In light of the substantial concessions made 
by the Respondent at the time of the Stipula-
tion and as partial consideration therefor, 
the Appellant agreed to pay her the sum of 
$50,000.00, at the rate of $5,000.00 per year 
without interest. To guarantee to the Respon-
dent that this would be paid, the Appellant's 
stock in Major Enterprises was agreed to be 
pledged as security therefor. 
It is also necessary to comment upon solid assets 
versus speculative assets. The assets with respect to which 
there is little question as to value and which cannot be con-
sidered as speculative were divided between the parties as 
follows: (R 398, 443) 
TO APPELLANT: 
A. All of the stock in Major Enter-
prises and the other corporations, 
with net values in excess of: $800,000.00 
B. The Appellant's profit sharing 
funds in Major Enterprises, with 
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a value of: $ 47,850.00 
C. The 3.1 acres of unimproved ground 
in downtown St. George, with a 
value of: $ 60,000.00 
TOTAL NON-SPECULATIVE PROPERTIES 
AWARDED TO APPELLANT: $907,850.00 
TO RESPONDENT: 
D. The family residence in Salt Lake 
City, with a value of: 
E. Stock in Intermountain Land & 
Development Corporation (liquida-
ted by Respondent): 
F. Receivable from Appellant: 
G. The fourteen apartments in St. 
George, with a net value of: 
TOTAL NON-SPECULATIVE PROPERTIES 
AWARDED TO RESPONDENT: 
$103,000.00 
$ 7,000.00 
$ 50,000.00 
$ 33,000.00 
$193,000.00 
AWARD OF SPECULATIVE PROPERTIES: 
TO APPELLANT: 
A. Holidair Lands stock and contract 
receivable on Sandberg and Nelson 
properties, less $252,000.00 con-
tingent payable to Respondent: 
B. 600 acres of Seegmiller land: 
TOTAL SPECULATIVE TO APPELLANT: 
$448,762.50 
$208,000.00 
$656,7 62.50 
-28-
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TOTAL SPECULATIVE TO RESPONDENT: 
A. Contingent Holidair Land contract $252,000.00 
B. 600 acres of Seegmiller property: $208,000.00 
TOTAL SPECULATIVE TO RESPONDENT: $460/000,00 1/ 
It is obvious from the foregoing analysis that the 
trial court considered the quality of the properties and awar-
ded both some speculative and non-speculative assets to each 
party. If there is a failure with respect to any of the spec-
ulative assets, both parties lose. If there is a loss on the 
Nelson-Sandberg properties, both parties lose. Since the 
Respondent's interest is fixed at $252,000.00, if there is a 
gain over current values, only the Appellant gets the benefit 
thereof. If there is a gain or loss on the Seegmiller prop-
erty, both parties will be affected thereby* 
The trial court could have avoided all of the prob-
lems of this evaluation and the quality of the various prop-
erties by just awarding to each of the parties proportionate 
shares of stock in the corporations and undivided interests 
in the land and contracts receivable. Rather than adopt the 
easy course, the trial court has wisely attempted to sever 
the relationship between the parties and their joint inter-
est in properties. Considering the many complexities, the 
trial court has excelled in structuring a judgment that will 
1/ All of the values referred to throughout this Brief are 
set forth in the defendant's Memorandum commencing on 
page 334 of the Record and continuing through page 356. 
The evaluations are further set forth in the Courtfs Find-
ings of Fact commencing at page 377 of the Record and con-
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permit the parties to go on their independent ways. Further-
more, if there is some error in the evaluation because of the 
division made by the Court, both parties will be appropriately 
affected thereby. 
At the commencement of the hearing in July of 1974, 
the parties stipulated that there need be no change with ref-
erence to alimony or child support or a number of other miscel-
laneous items. The Respondent does not seek further alimony. 
She does not wish to continue indefinitely to be that depen-
dent upon the Appellant. What the Respondent desires and 
what she is properly entitled to is a fair share of the assets 
that were acquired by the mutual efforts of the parties dur-
ing the marriage. 
The record conclusively demonstrates thcit the Respon-
dent has not had awarded to her any more than a fciir share of 
the assets. The award to Appellant of approximately two-thirds 
of the net assets is more than fair and equitable. 
Because of the foregoing, it is submitted that there 
has been no inequity or unfairness to the Appellant, and this 
Court need not either modify the Decree or remand the matter 
to the trial court for further proceedings. 
POINT III • 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO PROCEED 
WITH A FURTHER HEARING AND TO MODIFY THE 
JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE DIVISION OF THE 
MARITAL ESTATE. 
Secion 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended, 
provides as follows: 
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" . . . The court shall have continuing 
jurisdiction to make such subsequent 
changes or new orders with respect to 
the support and maintenance of the par-
ties, the custody of the children and 
their support and maintenance, or the 
distribution of the property as shall be 
reasonable and necessary." 
The above quoted statute contains in clear and 
unambiguous language a legislative grant of jurisdiction to 
the Court to make such subsequent changes or new orders with 
respect to the distribution of the property as shall be 
"reasonable and necessary". 
The Decree of Judge Faux of November 22, 1973 con-
tained a specific reservation of jurisdiction. 
This Court, in its Decision with respect to the 
Appeal from the Faux Decree, reported in Klein v. Klein, 30 
Utah 2d 1, 511 P.2d 1284 (1973), used the following language: 
"This seems to be a rather unusual order." 
"We think this was highly improper and may 
have been prejudicial." 
"The Judge who tried this case has been 
retired because of age, and another Judge 
will hear any future matters, so that 
counsel's fear of bias is of no import." 
"If the Decree causes financial distress, 
the ruling made can be reviewed if within 
one year after final judgment either party 
requests it." 
"Another possible reason for having the 
matter looked at within a year is the dis-
tribution of the assets." 
"The decision of the Court was based upon an 
assumption that the net value of the assets 
of the plaintiff was $225,000.00 . . . " 
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"Having confidence in the integrity of our 
trial courts and the ability of the judge 
to review the matter if presented to them, 
we affirm the judgment rendered and leave 
it to the lower court to determine if a modi-
fication should be made.11 
It is obvious from the above quoted language that 
this Court acknowledged the possibility of improprieties in 
the Faux Decree, and recognized that the trial court did 
have the right upon the application of either party to look 
at the* "distribution of the assets". 
The trial court, Judge Sawaya, made reference to 
the language in the Supreme Court decision and concluded 
that he had a duty to conduct further proceedings with res-
pect to economic matters (R 233 through 236). 
A domestic relation proceeding and division of the 
"marital estate" is essentially a proceeding in equity. 
"A measure of discretion is exercised by 
a court of equity in determining whether 
it will take jurisdiction of a case. Like-
wise, a court of equity is generally permit-
ted to exercise discretion in determining 
whether or not, on the facts presented at 
the trial, relief should be granted, and if 
so, the extent of the relief. Ordinarily, 
the propriety of affording equitable relief 
in a particular case rests in the sound 
discretion of the court, to be exercised 
according to the circumstances and exigen-
cies of the case . . . Judicial discretion 
to grant relief becomes a judicial duty to 
grant it under some circumstances, and the 
grace which equity should bestow then becomes 
a matter of right." 
" . . . Equity looks at the whole situation 
and grants or withholds relief as good con-
science dictates, and a court of equity is 
bound to look into all the facts and circum-
stances and determine what is fair, just and 
equitable . . . " 
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"The power of equity is said to be coexten-
sive with the right to relief; it is as broad 
as equity and justice require. In the admini-
stration of remedies, an equity court is not 
bound by the strict or rigid rules of the 
common law, on the contrary, the court adapts 
its relief and molds its decrees to satisfy 
the requirements of the case and to protect 
and conserve the equities of the parties liti-
gant. The court has such plenary power, since 
its purpose is the accomplishment of justice 
amid all of the vicissitudes and intricacies 
of life. It is said that equity has always 
preserved the elements of flexibility and 
expansiveness so that new remedies may be 
invented or old ones modified in order to 
meet the requirements of every case and to 
satisfy the needs of a progressive social 
condition. In other words, the plastic 
remedies of equity are molded to the needs 
of justice and are employed to protect the 
equities of all parties, and the flexibility 
of equitable jurisdiction permits innovation 
in remedies to meet all varieties of circum-
stances which may arise in any case. More-
over, the fact that there is no precedent 
for the precise relief sought is of no con-
sequence . . . " (27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity, 
§§ 102-103). 
There can be no doubt that the trial court had 
jurisdiction with the right and even the obligation to conduct 
further proceedings in this matter. The trial court did so, 
and the wisdom thereof is demonstrated by the results. While 
Judge Faux found the marital estate to have a value of approxi-
mately $225,000.00, on the further proceedings by Judge Taylor, 
and considering the same properties, the values were found to 
be approximately $2,000,000.00. The Faux evaluation was 
subject to a claim by the Respondent that Judge Faux was biased 
and prejudiced. No such claim has been made by the Appellant 
with respect to the Judge Taylor proceedings. 
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It should also be noted that while the Appellant 
doesn't like the results and disagrees with the values estab-
lished by Judge Taylor, he doesn't contend that the findings 
with respect to values are unsupported by the evidence. As 
a matter of fact, the evidence amply justifies and supports 
the findings by Judge Taylor with respect to properties and 
values. 
The Respondent further notes that Appellant fails 
to cite one authority in support of his contention that the 
trial court was without jurisdiction. 
It has to be concluded, then, that the trial court 
did have jurisdiction and that Point III of the Appellant is 
without merit. -
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INCLUDED CERTAIN ASSETS 
IN THE MARITAL ESTATE 
It is acknowledged by the Respondent that the Court 
should not necessarily consider assets not accumulated during 
the marriage as part of the marital estate. 
Contrary, however, to the assertions of the Appel-
lant that the Seegmiller property was acquired after the 
divorce action was commenced, the record amply demonstrates 
that Robert D. Klein first took an option on the Seegmiller 
2/ property on the 31st day of May, 1962 (Ex. 7-D) . -' 
2/ The typed copy of this Option Agreement set forth in pages 
~~ 30-32 of the Appellant's "Abstract" shows the date of May 
31, 197 2. Whether intentionally or inadvertently, this is 
in error. Observation of Ex. 7-D and page 62 of the record, 
which is a Xerox copy of the original, reveals that it was, 
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Thus, the option was first acquired some ten years prior to 
the divorce through the joint efforts of the parties and 
with funds accumulated by the parties. The funds continued 
to be paid and the option continued to be extended for a 
period of ten years, and was then finally exercised by the 
Appellant. It is not difficult to understand why the Respon-
dent in 1972, after the Appellant had left the family resi-
dence and commenced a divorce action, refused to join the 
Appellant in the execution of a further promissory note. This 
does not detract from the fact that the option and the prop-
erty represented thereby was a valuable property right acquired 
some ten years prior to the divorce. 
Joint assets were used to acquire the option, to 
continue to extend it, and to exercise it. The Appellant 
notes that he has borrowed funds since 1971 with which to 
maintain the properties. The Appellant had the opportunity 
at time of trial and, in fact, used the opportunity, to have 
the Court consider all of his liabilities in arriving at the 
net worth of the marital estate. The liabilities of the 
Appellant were subtracted from the gross assets to arrive at 
net values. Furthermore, while the borrowing of funds to 
make a payment on property may create a debt, there is a cor-
responding and offsetting increase in the equity of the prop-
erty. 
Under the circumstances, the inclusion of the Seeg-
miller property as a jointly acquired marital asset was 
proper. 
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POINT V 
THE EVALUATION OF THE ASSETS AS OF THE TIME 
OF THE MODIFICATION HEARINGS WAS NOT IN ERROR, 
AND DID NOT CREATE ANY SUBSTANTIAL OR SIGNIFI-
CANT VARIATIONS IN THE PROPERTIES TO BE AWARDED 
TO THE PARTIES. 
The Appellant makes some claim that there is some 
technical deficiency in the date of the evaluation of the 
assets. There was only a two-year difference in time between 
the date of original evaluation in the Faux trial and the 
date of evaluation in the Taylor trial. 
On page 42 of the first Brief filed by the Appel-
lant, and on page 45 of the second Brief filed by the Appel-
lant, the Appellant concedes that the valuation date was not 
of significance when he writes, 
"Their value was fully litigated by both 
sides, those values have not changed sig-
nificantly since they were first litigated 
and determined at the original trial." 
Thus, the Appellant acknowledges that the date of 
evaluation was not significant. 
Even if the date of evaluation were significant, 
can it be said that the Respondent is not entitled to share 
in the fluctuating values of the assets acquired during the 
marriage pending the final disposition of those assets? We 
think not. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT'S EVALUATION OF THE MARITAL 
ASSETS WERE FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
AND THE LAW. 
The Appellant does not contend that the valuations 
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fixed by the trial court are unsupported by the evidence. 
Rather, the Appellant merely complains that the values are 
grossly inconsistent with those established in the November, 
19 72 Judgment. Logic suggests that these inconsistencies 
should not comfort the Appellant, but that they justify the 
entire modification proceedings and the November 11, 1974 
Judgment rendered with respect thereto. 
The values fixed by Judge Taylor in 1974 are fully 
and amply supported by the evidence. Calculations with res-
pect to those values and the Court's Findings with respect 
thereto are carefully and fully set out in the record (R 334 
through 356 and R 377 through 389). The Respondent will not 
trifle further with this Court's time by setting forth in 
detail all of the material referred to. 
The Appellant complains about the treatment of the 
Holidair Land contract receivable. The values with respect 
to Holidair Lands, Inc. and the stock owned by the Appellant 
and the contract receivable owned by the Appellant are set 
out in detail in the Court's Findings of Fact (R 380 through 
382). The values of the land involved with Holidair Lands, 
Inc. were determined by the Court to be as follows: 
A. 325 acres, at a value of $1,573.00 per 
acre, equals $511,000.00. 
B. 95 acres, at a value of $3,522.00 per acre, 
equals $335,000.00. 
The Court granted to the Respondent a $600.00 per acre interest. 
The Appellant suggests that the contract receivable 
should have been discounted to reflect the diference between 
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the contract interest rate and the market interest rate for 
contract receivables. The Appellant fails to recognize that 
under the Judgment as fashioned by the Court, the Appellant 
owes the Respondent nothing with respect to this property 
unless and until such time as the Appellant either sells or 
uses the property. At that time, there is due and payable 
to the Respondent the sum of $600.00 per acre as the land is 
sold or used until the Respondent has received the sum of 
$252,000.00. The obligation is contingent upon the use or 
sale of the land by the Appellant and the obligation and the 
burden does not carry any interest. Since the obligation is 
not burdened with interest and since the Appellant is not 
required to pay the Respondent until he sells or uses the 
property, we cannot understand Appellant's contention that 
there should be a discount because of an interest factor. 
Furthermore, the Appellant may hold this land indefinitely, 
subject only to the requirement to pay to the Respondent the 
sum of $600.00 per acre when the land is sold or used. As 
the matter is structured, the Appellant will get the full bene 
fit of any appreciation, since the Respondent's interest 
therein is fixed at an absolute dollar amount. 
The Appellant complains about the method used to 
determine the value of the Appellant's stock in Major Enter-
prises. The simple facts are that 50% of the stock is owned 
by one Verl O'Brien and the other 50% of the stock stands in 
the name of the Appellant. This creates an absolute deadlock 
situation with respect to the management of the corporation. 
--}£-
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Either party may demand a liquidation of the corporate assets 
at any time (§16-10-92, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as Amended). 
The continuation of the corporate business in corporate form 
is conditioned upon the continuing agreement and acquiescence 
of both Mr. O'Brien and the Appellant. Under these circum-
stances, the corporate stock as such has no market value as 
a stock. Its only value to anyone would be the value in the 
event of liquidation, in which event, all assets would be 
sold, all obligations would be paid and the balance would be 
divided between the parties. This is the basis upon which 
the Court approached the matter and evaluated the assets 
held by the corporation, then subtracted therefrom the liabili-
ties, to arrive at the liquidated net worth of the corporation 
which was then divided by two, to determine Appellant's value 
in this asset (R 343 through 346 and 379). It is submitted 
that there is no other reasonable or equitable way to deter-
mine the value of this asset. Even though Appellant claims 
the value of Major is grossly exaggerated, the Respondent has 
always been willing to accept the Major Enterprises stock (or 
for that matter, any other asset) by way of distribution to 
her at the values fixed by the Court. The Respondent has 
offered and does hereby again offer to settle this matter by 
having awarded to her only the residence and the stock in 
Major Enterprises. We renew such overture. We are confident 
that Appellant will not accept this offer, but Respondent 
would be pleased if he did so. 
The Appellant complains of the values given to the 
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Seegmiller land. The fact is, and the Appellant's own Brief 
so indicates, that Mr. Gus Johns, a well-known and well-quali-
fied appraiser, made a study and an appraisal of this 1200-
acre parcel of land and discounted its value because of the 
unavailability of water. With water, the land would have been 
worth substantially more. In any event, the precise evaluation 
of this particular land is of little moment, since each of 
the parties were awarded one-half thereof. If the land has 
a lesser value than that testified to by Mr. Johns, both par-
ties will be equally affected thereby. 
It is submitted that there are no significant or 
material errors with respect to the valuation of the marital 
assets. 
POINT VII 
THE RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES WILL NOT BE ADVERSELY 
AFFECTED BY THE JUDGMENTS RENDERED IN THIS MATTER. 
The Appellant personally acquired the interest in 
the Sandberg property under an Option Agreement dated the 
21st day of September, 1964 (R 51 and Ex. 6-D). The Appellant 
personally acquired his interest in the Nelson property under 
an Agreement entered into in 1970 (R 63 and Ex. 32-D). In 
February of 1971, the Appellant then entered into an Agreement 
with Holidair Lands, wherein he sold the Nelson and Sandberg 
lands to Holidair Lands for the contract sum of $504,000.00. 
The contract specifically provides, "The Seller (Appellant) 
shall release one acre, to be selected by the Buyer (Holidair 
Lands, Inc.) for each $1,200.00 paid by the Buyer to the Seller 
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under the terms and conditions of this agreement." (Ex. 5-D) . 
It is clear, then, that Holidair Lands, Inc. and 
its shareholders (Appellant and one Rogers), do not acquire 
any title and interest in and to the lands except only from 
the Appellant, and only at such times as Holidair Lands pays 
to Appellant the sum of $1,200.00 per acre. The effect of 
this, then, is that the rights of Holidair Lands in and to the 
acres is not in any way jeopardized, since it has an absolute 
right to receive the same upon payment of the $1,200.00 per 
acre. At such time as Holidair Lands pays to Appellant the 
$1,200.00 per acre, the Appellant must pay to the Respondent 
the sum of $600.00, and upon doing so, Respondent's lien with 
respect to the acreage is satisfied and discharged. Contrary 
to assertions by the Appellant, the property division was 
structured in such a fashion that the rights of the Respondent 
to $600.00 per acre will in no way interfere with the rights 
of Holidair Lands and/or its other shareholder pursuant to 
the Agreement of February, 1971, whereunder Holidair Lands 
received its rights to acquire property from the Appellant 
(Ex. 5-D). 
The Appellant also suggests that the Judgment of the 
Court will affect the interest of one Verl O'Brien, who owns 
50% of the stock of Major Enterprises, because of some rights 
that Verl O'Brien has with respect to the stock in Major 
Enterprises owned by Appellant. Again, contrary to assertions 
of the Appellant in his Brief, the Judgment will in no way 
affect the rights of Verl O'Brien. The stock will be pledged 
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with the Court, subject to whatever rights Verl O'Brien has, 
and can be dealt with by the Court subject only to the rights 
of Verl O'Brien. 
It should further be noted with respect to the rights 
of Verl OfBrien that the Buy and Sell Agreement between Appel-
lant and O'Brien with respect to Major provided for an annual 
re-evaluation of the consideration to be paid in the event of 
a sale by either one of the shareholders. The last evaluation 
was in 1968. The agreements with respect to buy and sell, 
and the evaluation of the stock, were for insurance* purposes, 
and at the time of the trial in 1974, did not reflect the real 
values (T 1499 through 1501). 
It is submitted, then, that the issues raised in 
Point VII of Appellant's Brief with respect to affecting the 
rights of others, is contrary to the facts and to the Judgments 
entered by the Court, and are without merit. The Judgment wil 
in no way affect the rights of the other shareholder in Holidair 
Lands (Mr. Rogers), nor the rights of Mr. O'Brien to acquire 
Appellant's stock in Major Enterprises. What the Judgments 
simply do is assure to the Respondent that the Appellant may 
not dispose of his properties without providing for the pay-
ments due and owing by the Appellant to the Respondent from 
the proceeds of such disposition by the Appellant. The arrange-
ment simply secures the Respondent's interest, so that she 
may not be deprived thereof by the further conduct of the 
Appellant. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Judgment of November 11, 1974, divided the net 
marital assets as follows: 
TO THE APPELLANT: $931,602.63 
TO THE RESPONDENT: $743,287.35 
The stipulated modification dated December 18, 1974, 
resulted in the following division: 
TO THE APPELLANT: $1,131,602.63 
TO THE RESPONDENT: $ 543,287.35 
The Respondent submits that the division of the 
marital estate pursuant to the Judgment of November 11, 1974, 
was a fair, just and equitable division thereof, and that 
the stipulated modification of December 18, 1974, rendered 
the matter even more favorable to the Appellant. 
It is obvious that the Appellant has been treated 
equitably, and that because thereof, this Court should 
either (i) grant the motion of the Respondent set forth at 
the conclusion of Respondent's Point I and dismiss the 
appeal; (ii) grant the relief prayed for by the Appellant by 
setting aside the modification to the Judgment dated December 18, 
1974, and declaring that the Judgment of November 11, 1974 
is the effective, existing and extant Judgment between the 
parties, or (iii) affirm the Judgment of the trial court of 
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November 11, 1974, as modified by the stipulated modification 
with respect thereto, dated December 18, 1974. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
sL 
RO] OBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
AMES P. COWLEY 
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